The demandingness of Nozick’s ‘Lockean’ proviso

Interpreters of Robert Nozick’s political philosophy fall into two broad groups concerning his application of the ‘Lockean proviso’. Some read his argument in an undemanding way: individual instances of ownership which make people worse off than they would have been in a world without any ownership are unjust. Others read the argument in a demanding way: individual instances of ownership which make people worse off than they would have been in a world without that particular ownership are unjust. While I argue that the former reading is correct as an interpretive matter, I suggest that this reading is nonetheless highly demanding. In particular, I argue that it is demanding when it is expanded to include the protection of nonhuman animals; if such beings are right bearers, as more and more academics are beginning to suggest, then there is no nonarbitrary reason to exclude them from the protection of the proviso

Robert Nozick on nonhuman animals : rights, value and the meaning of life

In his chapter, Josh Milburn argues that Robert Nozick considers nonhuman animals in his philosophical writings, but that these discussions are downplayed in animal ethics and Nozick scholarship. This is regrettable, Milburn proposes, as Nozick is far more sympathetic to animal rights than many other libertarians. Milburn thus offers an analysis of Nozick’s animal ethics. Nozick’s arguments concerning vegetarianism and speciesism are considered, and Milburn argues that tensions in Nozick’s political philosophy potentially open the door to animal rights. Whatever their place in his political philosophy, Milburn contends, nonhuman animals find a comfortable home in Nozick’s axiology and ethics, with their value and the significance of our duties towards them affirmed. Milburn concludes that animal ethicists could learn from Nozick’s distinctive arguments and approaches and find an unexpected ally

Adam Smith and the theory of punishment

A distinctive theory of punishment plays a central role in Smith's moral and legal theory. According to this theory, we regard the punishment of a crime as deserved only to the extent that an impartial spectator would go along with the actual or supposed resentment of the victim. The first part of this paper argues that Smith's theory deserves serious consideration and relates it to other theories such as utilitarianism and more orthodox forms of retributivism. The second part considers the objection that, because Smith's theory implies that punishment is justified only when there is some person or persons who is the victim of the crime, it cannot explain the many cases where punishment is imposed purely for the public good. It is argued that Smith's theory could be extended to cover such cases. The third part defends Smith's theory against the objection that, because it relies on our natural feelings, it cannot provide an adequate moral justification of punishment

Imperfect identity

Questions of identity over time are often hard to answer. A long tradition has it that such questions are somehow soft: they have no unique, determinate answer, and disagreements about them are merely verbal. I argue that this claim is not the truism it is taken to be. Depending on how it is understood, it turns out either to be false or to presuppose a highly contentious metaphysical claim

Sequential Extensions of Causal and Evidential Decision Theory

Moving beyond the dualistic view in AI where agent and environment are separated incurs new challenges for decision making, as calculation of expected utility is no longer straightforward. The non-dualistic decision theory literature is split between causal decision theory and evidential decision theory. We extend these decision algorithms to the sequential setting where the agent alternates between taking actions and observing their consequences. We find that evidential decision theory has two natural extensions while causal decision theory only has one.Comment: ADT 201

Inquiry and the transmission of knowledge

No abstract available

Seeking the Real Adam Smith and Milton Friedman

In this paper we will analyze the relationship between free market principles and ethics through an exploration of how too many business managers often approach the ideas of Adam Smith and Milton Friedman. In doing so, we aim to provide a thoughtful foundation for future discussions of how we ought to navigate this intersection. We briefly examine questions such as: What is the relationship between the “best” economy in terms of efficiency and the common good for society? Is pursuing one’s individual economic advantage the same as promoting the general interest? As we analyze and discuss these questions, specifically in the context of Smith and Friedman, we also make some alternative normative assertions, grounded in social welfare, about adopting a broader societal perspective for the purpose of business

Trouble in Paradise - A disabled person's right to the satisfaction of a self-defined need:Some conceptual and practical problems

This paper questions the usefulness of the rights-based approach to ameliorating the social situation of disabled people in Britain and advances two criticisms. First, that rights and self-de? ned needs have been under-theorised by disability theorists to the extent that they have insuf? ciently appreciated the problems that these approaches pose. The paper suggests that rights to appropriate resources to satisfy self-de? ned needs will generate vast numbers of competing rights claims and that the resulting tendency of rights to con? ict has been under-appreciated. Secondly, that there has been little consideration of how these con? icts might be reconciled. The ? rst two sections of the paper look at the concepts of ascribed and self-de? ned needs, respectively, whilst the ? nal one looks at some of the problems of the rights approach and some of the dif? culties of making self-de? ned need the basis of rights claims

Free Will in a Quantum World?

In this paper, I argue that Conway and Kochen’s Free Will Theorem (1,2) to the conclusion that quantum mechanics and relativity entail freedom for the particles, does not change the situation in favor of a libertarian position as they would like. In fact, the theorem more or less implicitly assumes that people are free, and thus it begs the question. Moreover, it does not prove neither that if people are free, so are particles, nor that the property people possess when they are said to be free is the same as the one particles possess when they are claimed to be free. I then analyze the Free State Theorem (2), which generalizes the Free Will Theorem without the assumption that people are free, and I show that it does not prove anything about free will, since the notion of freedom for particles is either inconsistent, or it does not concern our common understanding of freedom. In both cases, the Free Will Theorem and the Free State Theorem do not provide any enlightenment on the constraints physics can pose on free will